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Abstract

diversification trends of information systems security

Confronted with the increasingly severe information

problems are getting evident: hackers spread, privacy

security problems, proper configuration of security

issues, computer network crime, confidence crisis,

technologies is critical to enhance the information

variety purposes of system invasion, etc., especially

systems performance. To solve the integrated linkage

the

control problem based on attack detection, the

problems. In view of rigorous information security

security model including firewall, intrusion detection

trend, all kinds of IT security measures were

system (IDS) and vulnerability scan is analyzed by

successively

game theory. The analyses show that more IT

technologies include firewall, IDS and vulnerability

portfolio will not bring better benefits, and more

scan, etc.

fixed vulnerabilities are not the better choice for the

advantages and limitations, and only the proper

firm either. However, reasonable configuration of

configuration of IT can achieve the information

firewall will always reduce the firm’s expected loss.

system dynamic security, which is the key to balance

According to the Nash equilibrium of the model,

the information protection and information access as

technical parameters are configured to minimize the

well.

firm’s expected loss.

Different information system security problems can

Key words: economics of information systems;

be solved by different IT portfolios. In general,

firewall; IDS; vulnerability scan; security portfolio

according to the different security threats and

strategy

protection focuses, information system security

increasingly

[3]

severe

found.

e-commerce

Mainstream

security

security

. Nevertheless each IT has its own

1 Introduction

should generate the following five strategies: the

With the rapid development of microelectronics and

integrated linkage control problem based on attack

emergence of information industry, the tide of

detection; the border security control problem based

informatization is billowy. An important feature of

on active defense; the unified access management

information age is accessing to information and

problem based on source control; the integrated

exchanging information by network [1], e-commerce

threat management problem based on security fusion;

has developed rapidly, and online transaction of

the closed-loop strategy management problem based

[2]

enterprises has carried on actively . But science and

on asset protection. Our findings offer solutions to

technology is two sides sword. When the whole

the integrated linkage control problem based on

society popularizes information technology, the

attack

detection,

it

mainly

needs

to
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vulnerability scan, intrusion detection, firewall, etc.,

traditional use of a single IT. For instance, Li etc.

and to achieve a linkage control between firewall,

have analyzed the intrusion prevention system

IDS, routers and switches. In this problem, all the

management and configuration by inspection game

security threats are reflected in the attacker's

theory

malicious behavior. The attacks are effectively

nonzero-sum and non-cooperative dynamic game

recognized by detecting their behavior characteristics.

between two players [12]. Cavusoglu and Raghunathan

As a result, the linkage between security equipment

have respectively analyzed the IDS configuration

and network equipment executes an effective control

based on decision theory and game theory, when it

to prevent the attacks.

defends the attacks

At present, there are two significant trends to address

research on the use of IT portfolios. Piessens has

the information system security. One transition is

proposed that if the IT selection and portfolios are

from the traditional IT security to the integration of

used

IT and security management; the other transition is

successfully by the weakness in the installation of

from the traditional use of a single IT to the use of IT

software, which means the more use of IT may not

portfolios. The traditional information security

be able to improve the security

technology methods are mainly studied in a purely

Raghunathan have proposed the evaluation model of

technical aspect, whose research has focused on the

information security technologies on game theory,

design of algorithms related to firewalls, IDS and

which include firewall, intrusion diction system and

others, such as encryption. For example, various

intrusion tolerant

approaches to firewall design are discussed in

configuration of and interaction between a firewall

[4], [5]

[11]

.Alpcan has established the model of

[13]

. However, there is little

inappropriately,

the hackers may attack

[14]

. Zhu and

[15]

. Cavusoglu etc. have studied

. The algorithms

and IDS, and show that deploying a technology,

used in anomaly-based IDS are presented in

whether it is the firewall or the IDS, could hurt the

[6],

firm if the configuration is not optimized for the

Holden and Gouda and Liu

Neumann and Porras, and Zamboni and Spafford
[7]

firm’s environment [16].

and management aspect to study on the IT

Thus for the information security problems are very

configuration

which

important, there are a large number of relevant

integrate IT and security management. Therefore, in

domestic and international achievements in the recent

the last few years, a new research filed has arisen in

years, although the economics of information

information management system—Economics of

security is a new field. But most of the achievements

Information Security. Gal-Or and Ghose have

are based on one security IT, and there are few on the

analyzed the relationship between the security

security IT portfolios, especially on more than three

technology investments and information sharing by

IT portfolios. The development of information

game theory, and show that the higher substitutability

network is a game process between information

among the enterprises product, the more valuable the

protection

security information sharing, i.e. the more intense

technology. In this game, we assume that the player

competition industry will benefit more when it

using information protection technology is the firm,

. The other methods are studied in an economics
and

strategy

formulation,

[8]

technology

and

information

attack

establishes the sharing alliances . Lye and Wing

and the other player using information attack

have established a random game model, which

technology is the hacker, then the game transfers into

obtains the Nash equilibrium and the best strategy

the game between the firm and the hacker. The

selection between the managers and the attackers [9].

objective of the firm is to minimize its expected loss

Hu, Hart and Cooke have analyzed the role of

from intrusions; on the other hand, the hacker is to

external and internal influences on information

maximize his expected benefit. If the game is to

systems security in a neo-institutional perspective

[10]

.

achieve the balance, a reasonable strategy and proper

There are more abundant achievements on the

technical parameter configuration will be the key
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factors. In this paper, the security model including

Therein, the principle of firewall and IDS portfolio is

firewall, intrusion detection system (IDS) and

that, IDS is able to detect the intrusion outside the

vulnerability scan has been analyzed by game theory,

firewall, and firewall is able to further adjust the

and the problem of IT selection and optimal

security strategy by the feedback information of IDS,

configuration has been studied. Moreover, the game

which can prevent the intrusion behavior from the

strategy has been analyzed, and the impact on the

beginning, and that can greatly improve the entire

access control policy for the firm has been proposed

defense system performance. In addition, the

subsequently. In the end, it concludes the paper with

principle of IDS and vulnerability scan portfolio is

a discussion of the implications of our results and

that, IDS acquires the anomaly cases of attacks,

future research directions.

whereas scanner acquires the security risks of the

2 Information Security Model

objective system. The exist vulnerabilities in the

In a protected system, the protective measures are

system is able to be derived reversely by the attack

usually deployed to defense the security incidents by

information from IDS; on the other side, the system

the system security policy

[17]

. For sake of analysis,

risks are able to effectively connect with the attack

an information security model is introduced here

states to estimate and forecast the trend of attacks.

(Figure 1).

Cavusoglu etc.

[10]

have discussed the portfolio: only

deploy firewall and IDS; and deploy none of the

Internal access

technologies,

Internal users

which

have

researched

on

the

configuration of and interaction between firewall and
External access

A protected system
Firewall

IDS. The result is that default setting usually brings
the risk, and the vulnerabilities of software could be
easy found by the hacker in this case. When firewall

Monitor external

Monitor internal Monitor real-time

Circular

and IDS are in the same security system, only the

scanning

proper configuration can benefit the firm from both

Vulnerability

the security and economy. Based on paper [10], our

Scan

study focuses on the portfolio: only deploy IDS and

Intrusion detection system

Figure 1 Information Security Model

vulnerability scan; and deploy all the technologies.

Although each IT security has different objectives,

3 Model Analyses

they are not independent of each other in control.

We consider two types of users, the internal users and

Firewall can generally prevent intrusion, IDS can

external users. Internal users have access to the

detect intrusion, and vulnerability scan can identify

system from inside the firewall, i.e. they do not go

the security risks and the vulnerabilities exploited by

through the firewall; external users access the system

hackers. In practice, according to the network

from outside the firewall, and hence are validated by

topology, applications and safety requirements, we

the firewall. No matter the portfolio (ⅰ) only deploy

deploy the proper firewall; monitor the key points of

IDS and vulnerability scan, or the portfolio (ⅱ)

the network in real-time by IDS, adjust the system

deploy all the technologies, all users have to go

automatically by the system administrator or security

through the scanner at regular intervals. However, the

strategy after discovering the intrusion; scan the

principle of the scanner is regularly testing the

system at regular intervals to find the vulnerabilities

network risks, not as the same effect as firewall and

of configuration changes and fix them in time.

IDS which can defense or prevent the invasion. So

Generally there are four reasonable technology

the effect of scanner is ahead of risk control

portfolios: only deploy firewall and IDS; only deploy

initiatively for the firm, but for the hacker, it has

IDS

the

raised the potential cost of invasion. We discuss the

technologies; deploy none of the technologies.

three broad components of our model—hacker, firm,

and

vulnerability

scan;

deploy

all

The 10th International Conference on Electronic Business, Shanghai, December1-December 4 , 2010

Liurong Zhao, Shu-e Mei, Weijun Zhong

22

and technology, and define the parameters as follows.
（Ⅰ） Hacker
(1)

A hacker committing the intrusion



derives a benefit of
undetected.
(2)

if the intrusion in

If the intrusion is detected, the hacker



incurs a penalty of
We assume that



（ -）.

for a net benefit of

; that is, a hacker that is

detected does not enjoy a positive utility.
(3)

Denote the probability that a user

hacks by

when there is no intrusion.
(3)

The configuration cost of vulnerability scan

is cS ; the firm performs a manual investigation when
detects the intrusion, the potential benefit of scanner
for the firm is dS (S  1) , the potential cost of
scanner for the hacker is  S .
The objective of the firm is to minimize its expected
loss from intrusions; on the other hand, the hacker is

 (  [0,1] ).

to maximize his expected benefit. We perform the

（Ⅱ） Firm
(1)

PF I is the probability that the IDS raises an alarm

analysis using backward induction. That is, we first

The firm incurs a cost of c each time it

derive the equilibrium for the firm’s investigation

performs a manual investigation.

strategy and a user’s hacking strategy given the

(2)

firm’s implementation and configuration strategies,

When an intrusion is undetected, the firm

incurs a damage of d .

then figure out the equilibrium point. Subsequently,

(3)

we determine the firm’s optimal implementation and

If the firm detects an intrusion, the firm

 1) of d . It is

configuration strategy. Consequently, we derive the

reasonable to assume that c  d , so that the firm’s

we separately analyze the portfolio (ⅰ) only deploy

cost of investigation is not higher than the benefit it

deploy all the technologies.

gets if it detects an intrusion.

Portfolio (ⅰ): only deploy IDS and vulnerability

（Ⅲ）Technology

scan

prevents or recovers a fraction, (

equilibrium strategies. In the following paragraphs,
IDS and vulnerability scan, and the portfolio (ⅱ)

detection

Assume a user’s strategy SU∈｛H,NH｝, in which H

, i.e. firewall
stops an illegal external user. Probability of firewall

is to hack, NH is not to hack.; the firm’s strategy

false negative is 1  PD , i.e. firewall does not stop an

investigate, NI is not to investigate, and the first

illegal external user. Probability of firewall false
positive PFF  P(classify as a hacker∣user is a normal user) ,

when IDS raises an alarm, while the second element

(1)

Probability

of

firewall

P  P(classify as a hacker∣user is a hacker)
F
D

F

i.e. firewall stops a legal external user.
(2)

Similarly,
I

detection PD , i.e.

define

probability

of

IDS

PD I is the probability that the

IDS raises an alarm for an intrusion. Probability of
IDS false negative is 1  PD

I

i.e.

1  PD is the

（I,NI）,(NI,I),(NI,NI)｝, in which I is to
SF∈｛（I,I）
element in each ordered pair is the firm’s action
is the firm’s action when IDS does not raise an alarm.
Let

1

and

2

respectively denote the firm’s

investigation probabilities when the IDS raises an
alarm and when the IDS does not raise an alarm, in
which （1  [0,1]） ,

and （ 2  [0,1]） .

In

I

probability that the IDS does not raise an alarm for
I

an intrusion. Probability of IDS false positive PF i.e.

general,

 2  1

.

The

following

probability

computations are used in deriving the equilibrium.
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PDI
I
PDI +P（
F 1-）

（1）

(1  PDI )
（2）
(1  P ) +(1-PFI )(1- ）
I
D

FN
 c  2 d   2 (1    S )d
 2

F
FA
 0, N  0 cannot be
1
2

We can verify that,

P (alarm )=PDI  PFI (1  )  PFI   ( PDI  PFI ) （3）

P (no-alarm )=1  P  ( P  P )
I
F

I
D

I
F

（4）

P (hacker is detected )=1 PDI   2 (1  PDI ) （5）
The firm’s expected cost for the alarm FA and the
no-alarm FN states respectively are:

FN(2,) 2c2(12)d
2 2(1)dcS 
2 2dS （7）
Then the firm’s overall expected cost is:
F(1, 2,) 

H(1, 2,)  ( S )(1PDI  2(1PDI ))

the

F
FA
 0, N  0,
1
 2

or

Therefore

two

we

have

FA FN

1  2

.

equilibrium,

F
FA
 0, N  0 .
1
 2
possible

equilibrium

When 1

 1, 0   2  1 ,

In this scenario, (10) and (12) must equal to zero, and

2



and

respectively, we get

 2* 

  (    S ) PDI ,
(1  PDI )(    S )

(13)

* 

c(1  PFI )
,
d (  S )(1  PDI )  cPFI  cPDI

(14)

（9）

Proposition 1: The following mixed strategy profiles
constitute the Nash equilibrium for the IDS and
vulnerability scan.

(13) is substituted into 0  2  1，
PDI 

 When

 PDI ,

then


  S


  S

 PDI , the strategy profiles of

Nash equilibrium is:

((1* 1, 2* 
If

in

（8）

The hacker’s expected benefit is:

  S

Consequently,

and

(11)>0.Sloving (10) and (12) for

(PFI  (PDI  PFI ))FA(1,)  (1 PFI (PDI  PFI ))FN (2,)



simultaneously,

scenarios: 1 1,0  2 1 and 0  1  1,  2  0 .

FA ( 1 , )  1c  1 (1  1 )d  1 1 (1   )d  cS  1 1dS （6）

If

satisfied

（12）

 ( S )P *
c(1P )
), 
);
I
d( S )(1PDI ) cPFI cPDI
(1PD)( S )
I
D

I
F


 PDI ,
  S

  (    S ) PDI
c (1  PFI )
（（1,
),
)
I
(1  PD )(    S ) d (   S )(1  PDI )  cPFI  cPDI

Similarly, 0 

then

((1* 

(( 1*，  2*），  *）


cPFI
, 2*  0), *  I
).
I
(  S )PD
PD ( S )d  cPFI  cPDI

When

.

1  1,  2  0


 PDI ,the strategy profiles of Nash
  S

Proof: The first derivatives of (6), (7) and (9) are:

equilibrium is:

H
   (    S )( 1 PDI   2 (1  PDI ))


（10）

((  1*，  2*） ，  *）

FA
 c  1d  1 (1    S )d
1

（11）

c PFI

（（
, 0 ), I
)
I
(    S ) PD
PD (   S ) d  c PFI  c PDI

Conclusion 1: when


  S

.

 PDI , the profitable
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probability of hack invasion is higher than the
detected probability of hack invasion. That means the
portfolio of only deploy IDS and scanner cannot
benefit the firm, but hurt the firm. One of the reasons
is that, the manual investigation will be conducted as
soon as IDS has raised an alarm, which is very
expensive and inefficient. The other reason is that,
hacker prefers to intrude system in this case. Assume

P(A user is an external legal user)=

（1-PFF）
=Peout
（1-）（
+  [(1  )(1 PDF )   (1 PFF )]）
The firm’s expected cost for the alarm

 *  0.5,

c  d (  S )  0 , i.e.

we have

c  d (  S ) , which means the investigation cost
is higher than the firm’s benefit, so it cannot create
efficiency for the firm.
Conclusion 2: From the expression of equilibrium
strategy, whether


  S

P

I
D

or


  S

FNF with firewall states respectively are:

FAF =
（

PFI (1  ) Peout
PFI (1  ) Pin
+
） (18)
PDI +PFI (1  ) PDI +PFI (1  )

I

,  , S

(1  ) Peout
（1-P I）
(1  ) Pin （1-PFI）
FNF =
（ IF I
+
） (19)
I
1-PD -PF (1  ) 1-PD -PFI (1  )
Then the firm’s expected cost for the alarm
the no-alarm

P ,

FA and

FN states respectively are:

I
D

the defense strategy of the firm is relevant to the
parameters  ,  ,  S , PD , and

FAF and the

no-alarm

the probability of neutral for hacker’s intruding is 0.5,
then in this case, the probability that a user hacks

(17)

reflect the

FA ( 1 , )  1c  1 (1  1 )d 11 (1   )d  cS
11dS -
（

P I (1  ) Peout
PFI (1  ) Pin
+ IF
）
I
I
PD +PF (1  ) PD +PFI (1  )

requirements of the firm’s security environment; the

FN  ( 2 , )  2c  2 (1  2 )d  2 2 (1   )d  cS

intrusion strategy of the hacker is relevant to the

(1  ) Peout
(1  ) Pin （1-PFI）
（1-P I）
+
2 2 dS -
（ IF I
）
I
1-PD -PF (1  ) 1-PD -PFI (1  )

parameters

c, d ,  , S , PFI , PDI ,and

c , d ,  , S

reflect the characters of the hacker’s intrusion
Portfolio (ⅱ) deploy all the technologies, i.e.
Firewall, IDS and Vulnerability scan
We assume that



fraction of users is external users,



(20)

(21)

Then the firm’s overall expected cost is:

F ( 1 , 2 , )  Pe [( PFI  ( PDI  PFI )) FA ( 1 , )
(1  PFI  ( PDI  PFI )) FN  ( 2 , )]

(22)

The hacker’s expected benefit is:

of external users are legal

H(1, 2,)  (  S )(1PDI  2(1PDI )) (23)

users. The benefit to the firm under normal use by a

Proposition 2: The equilibrium when the firm

 , the other assumptions are the same

implements the firewall, IDS and vulnerability scan

and only a proportion

legal user is

is identical to the equilibrium in proposition 1.

as portfolio (ⅰ), then:

P(A user gains access to the system)=
+ [(1  )(1 PDF )   (1 PFF )]）=Pe
（1-）（

P(A user is an internal user)=
1-
=Pin
+ [(1 )(1 PDF )   (1 PFF )]）
（1-）（

Proof: To have the equilibrium point, evaluate
(15)

(16)

F 
H
 F A
 0,
 0, N  0

1
 2

1 ,  2

Through the observation, there are no
and
i.e.

(19),

so

if

 F A   F A  FN   FN
,


 1
 1   2
 2

in (18)

derivation,
,

then
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equilibrium in portfolio (ⅰ) is identical to the

intrusion strategy, but not imply that the more the

equilibrium in portfolio (ⅱ).

repair the better the system performance.

Conclusion 3: Although the equilibrium in portfolio

We make a tentative research on the information

(ⅰ) is identical to the equilibrium in portfolio (ⅱ),

security technology portfolios. Future research

FAF  0, FNF  0 , a proper configuration of

should investigate as follows: (1) Study on the

firewall will reduce the firm’s overall expected loss.

scan, for instance, how does the vulnerabilities in

If give the expected firm’s loss, the reduce parts by

scanner impact on the configuration of firewall and

firewall can be used to deploy the other technologies

IDS; (2) Consider a real firm as a research object,

or upgrades, which will improve the firm’s

then the optimal information security strategy is

information security environment.

proposed by configuring proper technical parameters.

Conclusion 4: No matter the portfolio (ⅰ) or (ⅱ),

(3) Solve the optimal configuration problems of the

dS in vulnerability scan does have impact on the

other four network security strategies in the

as

hacker’s intrusion strategy. The higher

dS , the

interaction between firewall, IDS and vulnerability

introduction part.
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